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I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is one of democracy's fundamental values. Its
importance takes on special connotations in nations where the separation of
powers is fragile. This is particularly true in many Western Hemisphere nations
- in transition from long years of dictatorships - that have political systems
characterized by weak judicial and legislative branches which fail to provide
effective counterweights to an all-powerful executive branch.
Argentine social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell has characterized such
systems as "delegative democracies," where a charismatic figure assumes the
presidency after relatively free elections, and then governs without the
traditional counterweights normally associated with a representative
democracy.1 Inherent in such "delegative democracies" is a risk of backsliding
into authoritarianism. Faced with serious problems with no easy solutions, the
popular enthusiasm that leads to the election of such charismatic leaders is
tempered by subsequent disillusion.
Since judicial and legislative powers in these nations are so weak, freedom
of expression - essential to every society - functions as the fundamental
counterweight. It allows information to be gathered and disseminated,
strengthens civil society, and facilitates individual participation in the
democratic process.
1. Guillermo O'Donnel, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 56 (1994).
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The importance of this right is diminished, however, if it is inadequately
protected under domestic law, or if the rules designed to protect it are not
respected.2 Prior censorship, contempt laws,3 and excessive subsequent liability
for defamation, libel, and slander are examples of measures that seriously
infringe upon the right to freedom of expression.'
Through the exercise of prior censorship, bureaucracies decide what
individuals can see, read, write, and produce by invoking such justifications as
"national security," "public order," "national morals," "truth in information,"
and "personal honor." Since the possibility for abusing prior censorship is so
great, enduring the exaggeration of free debate seems better than risking
censorship's "protective" suffocation.5
Contempt laws currently in force in seventeen countries in the region
penalize "offensive" expression directed at public officials. Punishing critics
of authority was a logical corollary that affirmed the superior power of those
who exercised it both in absolute monarchies based on divine right and in
dictatorships of a certain stripe. In a democracy, however, criticism free from
fear of punishment -especially when directed at authority - reaffirms egalitarian
principles and ensures that public officials carry out their duties with
transparency and responsibility.' Conversely, the threat or imposition of penal
sanctions suffocates democracy and responds to an authoritarian logic that is
incompatible with democratic tenets.
Rather than resort to prior censorship, some nations allow the subsequent
imposition of liability in cases of defamation, libel, and slander. If such liability
- under the guise of defense of honor - is exorbitant, however, its interference
with the free expression of ideas is comparable to that of prior censorship.'
Any of these measures can seriously affect or even destroy freedom of
expression. They are promulgated within a juridical context that provides
2. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
1998, OEA/ser.L.IvJl.102, doc. rev. 6, at vol. III [hereinafter 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur],
available at http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep98eng(Volume%20]Ila.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001). The
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression reported that anachronistic legislation exists in many American
states relative to freedom of expression and that such legislation is incompatible with the American
Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. Id. at ch. 11.
3. The phrase "contempt laws" is used to refer to what are known as leyes de desacato in Spanish.
Generally speaking, leyes de desacato punish offensive expressions directed at public officials. id. at ch. IV,
sec. A.
4. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
1999, OEA/ser.L./VJII.106, doc. rev. 6, at vol. MI [hereinafter 1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur],
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep99engVolune3.htn (last visited Apr. 4,2001).
5. See generally COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS athttp://www.cpj.org; WORLDPRESS FREEDOM
COMM., at http://www.wpfc.org/charter.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
6. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. A.
7. Id.
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norms under which their application is authorized under certain circumstances.
But such a context is clearly absent when crimes committed against journalists -
including assassination - go unpunished. 8 This brutal method of "silencing"
journalists - one hundred fifty have been assassinated in the region during the
last ten years9 - also intimidates nations as a whole by demonstrating the
possible tragic consequences that can result from the free expression of ideas.'
Freedom of expression is also seriously diminished by such de facto
measures as threats, economic measures that punish or reward the press for its
ideas, and public and private monopolies in information media.'" In addition,
the serious inadequacies to protect freedom of expression that exist within
domestic legal systems designed to protect freedom of expression reaffirm the
need for international - in this case hemispheric - protection of this fundamental
freedom.
International protection of human rights has developed since World War
H as a consequence of the tragic failure of international order based on absolute
sovereignty. As international protection of human rights developed,
international rules have been adopted and international institutions have been
created to oversee the process. The purpose of this article is to analyze freedom
of expression from the perspective of the rules and institutions that have been
created to supervise human rights in the Western Hemisphere, known as the
Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights ("Inter-American
System"). In view of this purpose, this article will discuss the regulatory
framework that applies to freedom of expression in the Inter-American System
by systematizing relevant jurisprudence which, due to its recency, has not been
sufficiently studied and disseminated. The rules that regulate the right to
freedom of expression in the Inter-American System will also be examined with
reference to how the rules have been interpreted by the organs created to
supervise compliance with them. Finally, this article will outline a series of
measures adopted to achieve full compliance with the applicable norms to
strengthen protection of this important freedom in the Western Hemisphere.
8. Id. at ch. TV, sec. C.
9. Id.
10. COMM. TO PROTECr JOURNALISTS, Attacks on the Press in 1999, at http'//www.cpj.org/
attacks99/frameeatt99/rightframe-att99.html (discussing results of worldwide survey by the Committee
to Protect Journalists) (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
11. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. Il.
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11. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Organs
The Inter-American System is a combination of norms and institutions that
apply to Western Hemisphere nations. The applicable rules consist principally
of the American Convention on Human Rights 2 ("American Convention") and
the American Declaration on Rights and Duties of Man 3 ("American
Declaration"). The institutions involved are the organs responsible for
supervising compliance with the established rules: the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 14 ("the Commission") and the Inter-American
Court for Human Rights15 ("the Court"). In addition to these supervisory
organs, the political organs of the Organization of American States ("OAS") -
consisting of the Permanent Council and the General Assembly - also share in
the responsibility of guaranteeing compliance with the rules designed to protect
human rights, including the right to freedom of expression.' 6 The task of
guaranteeing protection of human rights, including compliance with decisions
of the Court and the Commission, falls to the political organs, especially the
General Assembly. 7 As a result, the Court and the Commission submit their
reports to the General Assembly for approval. 8
To assist in guaranteeing compliance with the rules relative to freedom of
expression, the Commission created a special office dedicated to the protection
of the right to freedom of expression in 1998, called the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression 9 ("Special Rapporteur").
12. Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention].
13. O.A.S. Official Res., Adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States,
OEA/ser.LJVJII.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration], available at
http:llwww.cidh.oas. org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
14. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1998, OEA/ser.LJVJII.102, doc. 6 rev. (1998), at ch. I
[hereinafter IACHR 1998 Annual Report], available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep
98eng/Table%20of%2OContents.htm.
15. O.A.S., Annual Report of the Secretary General 1999-2000, at ch. II, available at
http://www.cidi.oas.orgtannualreport00-eannualreport99-00-3.htm.
16. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 19 U.N.T.S.3.
17. It should be noted that the performance of these organizations relative to fortifying freedom of
expression has been inadequate. See El Sistema Interamericano y los Derechos Humanos en la Region [The
Inter-American System and Human Rights Law in the Region], in LA LUCHA CONTRA LA POBREZA EN
AMERICA LATINA [THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR IN LATIN AMERICA] (Bemardo Kligsberg ed., 2000).
18. American Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 41, 65. Article 41 provides at section (g) that the
Commission "submit[s] an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States."
Id. at art. 41. Likewise, Article 65 establishes that in each regular session "the Court shall submit, for the
Assembly's consideration, a report on its work during the previous year." Id. at art. 65.
19. Summit of the Americas Information Network, Second Summit of the Americas, Declaration
of Santiago, (Apr. 18-19, 1998), available at http://www.summit-americas. org/chiledec.htm. The heads of
state participating in the summit affirmed that "a free press plays a fundamental role in [the area of human
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B. The Juridical Regime
The right to freedom of expression in the Inter-American System is
fundamentally established by Articles 13 and 14 of the American Convention
and by Article 4 of the American Declaration. Article 13 of the American
Convention expressly establishes that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This
right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph
shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to
subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly
established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health
or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods
or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over
newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to
impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public
entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole
purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of
childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to
any other similar illegal action against any person or group of persons
on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or
national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.2'
ights]," and reaffirned "the importance of guaranteeing freedom of expression, information, and opinion."
Id. In addition, they commended "the recent appointment of a Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
within the framework of the Organization of American States." Id.
20. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
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Article 14 adds the following:
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas
disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium
of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using
the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law
may establish.
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal
liabilities that may have been incurred.
3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every
publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television
company, shall have a person responsible who is not protected by
immunities or special privileges.2
Finally, Article 4 of the American Declaration provides that "[e]very person has
the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and
dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever."'22
The American Convention applies to the countries in the Western
Hemisphere that have ratified it. Those countries are Argentina, Barbados,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Chile, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.23 In contrast, the American Declaration is used in the United States,
Canada, and the following Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Guyana, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. 2' This article will focus on the
protections of the right to freedom of expression found in the American
Convention. Although freedom of expression is also a right under the American
Declaration, its formulation therein is more general. As a result, only the
American Convention provides the type of specificity that permits its content
and scope to be established, a fundamental norm of this important right.
The Commission supervises compliance with the rules through its case
system,' country visits," recommendations to member States,27 and through the
21. d. at art. 14.
22. American Declaration, supra note 13, at art. 4.
23. Claudio Grossman, Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System: The Current
Debate, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L PROC. 186, 188 n.8 (1998).
24. Id. at 188 n.9.
25. American Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 44-5 i. The Commission opens cases either on
its own initiative or in response to petitions filed by individuals affected by the violation of any right covered
by the American Convention. Grossman, supra note 23, at 188. Once the Commission analyzes a case, it
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activities of the rapporteurs. 28 The Court reviews cases presented to it by the
Commission and by member States that have recognized its competency.29 At
present, thirty-eight contentious cases have been brought by the Commission,
and one case has been brought by the government of Costa Rica.3" The Court,
like the Commission, can adopt preventative measures in cases where the risk
is "grave and imminent."3' To date the Court has adopted such measures in
twenty cases.32
publishes an opinion with respect to the existence of the alleged violation and offers recommendations to the
responsible member State. Id. If the State does not comply with the recommendation, the Commission may
also prepare a second report and offer the State a second opportunity to comply. Id. If the State still does not
comply, the Commission may publicly reveal the result of the report and its recommendations. Id. This is
the only possibility that exists relative to those States that have not ratified the American Convention. Id. For
States that have ratified the American Convention, the Commission may opt to either publish the report or
present it to the Court within three months after the first report is approved. Grossman, supra note 23, at 188.
When it appears before the Court, the role of the Commission changes from that of judge to that of
complainant Id. It acts in the name and in representation of the victim (generally designating the original
complainants as its legal advisers). Id. This case mechanism is one of the most efficient means available to
the Commission to review individual human rights violations. Id.; see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL.,
PROTECTING HUMAN RiGHrS IN THE AMERICAS 97 (1982).
26. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 25, at 140. Visits to a particular country are the result of a formal
invitation by the country, which originates either at the request of the political organs of the OAS, or on the
initiative of the country, or the Commission. Grossman, supra note 23, at 187-88. A country visit is a high
visibility event directed at mobilizing public opinion. The visit is followed by the publication of a report. id.
This type of mechanism is useful for massive and serious violations of human rights that require swift
mobilization of public opinion. Id.
27. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 41. The Commission also prepares proposals for
declarations and treaties. Grossman, supra note 23, at 187-88.
28. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 41. The Commission has named work groups and
special rapporteurs to confront problems having a "collective component," including a work group on prisons
along with special rapporteurs on issues concerning women and indigenous populations, as well as freedom
of expression. Grossman, supra note 23, at 189. All of the rapporteurs are members of the Commission
except the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note
2, at ch. IV, sec. C.
29. Grossman, supra note 23, at 188. The following countries have recognized the competency of
the Court: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at n.8.
30. For a list of cases resolved or pending before the Court, see lnter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series C,
Decisions and Judgments, available at http:lwww.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBUCAC/INDICES/
SERIESC.HTM (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
31. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 63(2) (providing that "[i]n cases of extreme gravity
and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such
provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration," and "[w]ith respect to a case
not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission").
32. For a list of these cases, see Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series E, Provisional Measures, available at
http://www.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/INDICES/SERIEE.HTM (last visited Feb. 24,2001).
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The Court also prepares "advisory opinions" to interpret human rights
treaties in the Western Hemisphere and to review the compatibility of such
treaties with the domestic laws of member States.33 Fifteen advisory opinions
have been adopted to date. 4 The advisory opinions that have been most
important in the area of the right to freedom of expression are Advisory Opinion
OC-05/85, "Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for
the Practice of Journalism" ("Advisory Opinion OC-05/85") 5 and Advisory
Opinion OC-07/86, "Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction"
("Advisory Opinion OC-07/86").3 6
The office of the Special Rapporteur was created by the Commission in
1998 to protect and promote freedom of expression in the Americas." In
October 2000, the Commission - interpreting the American Convention -
adopted the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression to guide the
activities of the Special Rapporteur.3 The Special Rapporteur's principal
activities include: 1) the preparation of general and specific thematic reports;
2) the creation of a hemispheric network for the protection of freedom of
expression; 3) visits to OAS member States to observe the freedom of
expression climate; and 4) the promotion of the right to freedom of expression
among OAS members.39 Underscoring the importance that the Commission
places on freedom of expression, its Special Rapporteur works on a full-time
33. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 64(1), (2). Article 64 establishes that:
1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the
interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of
human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs
listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.
2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that
state with opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the
aforesaid international instruments.
Id.
34. For a list of the Court's advisory opinions, see Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series A, Judgments and
Opinions, available at http:llwww.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ciIPUBLICAT/INDICES /SERIES-A.HTM (last
visited Feb. 12, 2001).
35. lIter-Am. Ct. H.R., Nov. 13, 1985, Series A, No. 5 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-5/85],
available at http://corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/SERIES_A/A_5_ ING.HTM (last visited Feb. 12,
2001).
36. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aug. 29, 1986, Series A, No. 7 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-07/86],
available at http:llcorteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICATISERIESAIA-7-NG. HTM (last visited Feb. 12,
2001).
37. IACHR 1998 Annual Report, supra note 14, at ch. H, sec. 5.
38. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/declaration.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
39. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. 1, sec. B.
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basis.' Moreover, since the Special Rapporteur is not one of the seven
commissioners who are responsible for the overall supervision of rights
protected under the American Convention, the office is dedicated exclusively
to the protection and promotion of freedom of expression.4'
As the following sections of this article illustrate, these organs have
interpreted the scope of the American Convention's rules on freedom of
expression as prohibiting prior censorship and authorizing subsequent
imposition of liability. In the process, they have established the scope of
permissible restrictions on this right that may apply in emergency situations, as
well as the existence of a right to correction or reply. They have also repeatedly
affirmed that in the Inter-American System there is a strong connection between
the right to freedom of expression and the development of democracy.42
1. The Scope of Freedom of Expression
Subsection one of Article 13 of the American Convention establishes the
right of individuals to think and express themselves freely.43 It also explains
exactly what freedom of expression means - "to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers" - and emphasizes that
the medium used is irrelevant, since expression can be communicated "either
orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of
one's choice."
Both the Court and the Commission have interpreted this provision of the
American Convention. In Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, for example, the Court
considered "whether there is a conflict or contradiction between compulsory
membership in a professional association as a necessary requirement to practice
journalism... and the international norms." '45
The Commission, for its part, has interpreted the scope of the right to
freedom of expression in the following cases: Jehovah's Witnesses v. Republic
of Argentina,' Francisco Martorell v. Chile,47 Hector Felix Miranda v.
Mexico,48 Juan Pablo Olmedo v. Chile,4 9 Horacio Verbitsky v. Argentina,O
40. IACHR 1998 Annual Report, supra note 14, at ch. II, sec. 5.
41. Id.
42. See generally 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2.
43. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(l).
44. Id.
45. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. II (referring to Articles 13 and 29 of the
American Convention on Human Rights).
46. Case 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V.II.47 (1978), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep78sp/argentina2137.htn.
47. Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.VJII.95 doc. 7 (1997), available at
http://www.cidb.oas.org/annualrep/96eng/96ench3k.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001).
48. Case 11.739, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V.IU.102 doc. 6 (1998), available at
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Victor Manuel Oropeza v. Mexico,5' and Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru.52 On
February 6, 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (to which the
Ivcher Bronstein case had been referred by the Commission) confirmed the
Commission's finding that Peru was responsible for violating Mr. Ivcher's right
to freedom of expression.53 The interpretative work of both of these organs has
established the following characteristics of the scope of freedom of expression
in the context of the Inter-American System.
a. Special Dual Character
The Court has found that freedom of expression possesses a special dual
character, in that it not only involves the right of individuals to express
themselves, but also the right of everyone to receive information and ideas.54
As such, a violation of the right to freedom of expression not only violates an
individual right, but also "a collective right to receive any information
whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts expressed by others. 'S
The Commission has also had several opportunities to discuss the dual
character of freedom of expression. In Martorell, where censorship of the book
Impunidad diplomatica [Diplomatic Impunity] was at issue, the Commission
asserted that:
Article 13 establishes a dual right: the right to express thoughts and
ideas, and the right to receive them. Therefore, arbitrary interference
that infringes this right affects not just the individual right to express
information and ideas but also the right of the community as a whole
to receive information and ideas of all kinds.56
In Ivcher Bronstein, the Israeli-born Peruvian citizen owner of a television
station was arbitrarily deprived of Peruvian nationality in order to impede the
exercise of his property rights. In this case, the Commission asserted it was
http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/98eng/Merits/Mexico%2011739.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
49. Case 11.803, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.LJV.Il.102 doc. 6 (1998), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/98eng/Admissibility/Chile%2011803.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
50. Case 11.012, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./VJI.88 doc. 9 (1995), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrept94eng/94ench3.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
51. Case 11.740, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./VJU.106 doc. 6 (1999), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrept99engtMeritstMexico/I 1.740.htrm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
52. Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.LIVJII.95 doc. 7 (1997), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annuakep/97eng/97ench3nan.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
53. Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Inter-Am. CL H.R., Sentence, Feb. 6, 2001 [hereinater Ivcher
Bronstein Sentence] (on file with author).
54. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 30.
55. Id.
56. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 53.
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clear the marked social character of this fundamental right has both an
individual perspective as well as a much broader one that is related to the
cultural framework society imposes upon it, that is, all who seek out and receive
information or opinions emitted by journalists.57 As such, all of society is the
victim in the case of a violation of freedom of expression.58
The dual character of freedom of expression was reiterated by the
Commission in the Oropeza case, where a Mexican journalist was assassinated
for allegedly criticizing government authorities in his newspaper column, which
included references to links between the police and drug trafficking.59 The
Commission affirmed that freedom of expression is universal and involves a
legal concept that aids everyone, whether individually or collectively, to
express, transmit, or disseminate thoughts, and, in parallel and correlative form,
that freedom to inform oneself is universal and involves the collective right to
receive information communicated by others without interference or distortion.'
b. Indivisibility of Expression and Dissemination
In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed the following:
[E]xpression and dissemination of ideas and information are
indivisible concepts. This means that restrictions that are imposed on
dissemination represent, in equal measure, a direct limitation on the
right to express oneself freely. The importance of the legal rules
applicable to the press and to the status of those who dedicate
themselves professionally to it derives from this concept.6
It added that "[flor the average citizen it is just as important to know the
opinions of others or to have access to information generally as is the very right
to impart his own opinions."
In Martorell, the Commission determined:
[T]he decision to ban the entry, circulation and distribution of the
book Impunidad diplomatica in Chile violates the right to impart
"information and ideas of all kinds," a right that Chile is bound to
respect as a State party to the American Convention. In other words,
the decision is an unlawful restriction of the right to freedom of
57. Ivcher Bronstein, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 31.
58. See generally Ivcher Bronstein Sentence, supra note 53.
59. Oropeza, Case 11 .740, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 2.
60. Id. at para. 51 (citing Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1980-1981, OEA/ser.L/./, at 122).
61. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 31.
62. Id. at para. 32.
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expression, in the form of an act of prior censorship disallowed by
Article 13 of the Convention. 3
In Miranda, the co-director of a Mexican weekly publication was
assassinated for authoring and publishing opinions critical of the government."
The Commission declared that freedom of thought and of expression under
Inter-American jurisprudence involves the freedom to voice and disseminate
ideas, as well as the complimentary freedom that every citizen has to receive
such information without illegal or unjustified interference.65
c. Irrelevance of Medium Employed
The American Convention provides that freedom of thought and of
expression includes the right to disseminate information and ideas by any
means.66 In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed that "freedom of
expression.., cannot be separated from the right to use whatever medium is
deemed appropriate to impart ideas and to have them reach as wide an audience
as possible."67 For its part, the Commission asserted in the complaint it filed in
the Ivcher Bronstein case that the American Convention consecrates the right
to disseminate information and ideas in artistic form or by any other means. 68
d. Protection of Individual Ideas and Those of Others
In protecting freedom of expression, no distinction is made between
protecting an individual's ideas and those of third parties. Protection is afforded
to the expression of opinions, thoughts, and ideas of all kinds, without
distinguishing whether they are one's own thoughts or those of others. The
Commission explained its position with respect to this point in its complaint
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Ivcher Bronstein case.
It asserted that Article 13 reflects a broad interpretation of freedom of
expression and personal autonomy, the object of which is to protect and foment
access to information, ideas, and expressions of all types, in order to fortify the
democratic process. 69 Respect for these freedoms is not limited to allowing the
circulation of "acceptable" opinions and ideas. The duty not to interfere with
63. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 59.
64. Miranda, Case 11.739, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 3.
65. Id. at para. 48.
66. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
67. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 3 1.
68. Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Ct. H.R., Complaint of the nter-Am. C.H.R., at 27 [hereinafter
Ivcher Bronstein Complaint] (on file with author).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the voicing of opinions and the dissemination of information, as well as the
enjoyment of the right to access information of all types, extends to the
circulation of information and opinions, and does not require the personal
approval of whoever represents the authority of the state in a given moment.7
e. Multiplicity of Forms of Expression
The right to freedom of expression is not limited to verbal expression; all
types of expression are protected, including silence.72 An example of the
judicially established scope of the protection is found in the case of Jehovah's
Witnesses.73 In 1976, the Argentine military dictatorship promulgated Decree
No. 1867/76, which prohibited the public exercise of the Jehovah's Witness
religion in Argentina.74 The government alleged this religion was based on
principles contrary to the Argentine nationality and basic state institutions.75 As
a result of the decree, followers of the religion were persecuted.76 More than
three hundred children were expelled from school after being accused of
refusing to swear allegiance to the country or to sing the Argentine national
anthem, opting instead for silence because their religion prohibited them from
engaging in such veneration of national symbols.77 Pursuant to Resolution No.
02/79, the Commission condemned the action of the Argentine government,
which it considered to be responsible for the alleged violations. 78
f Exclusion of Direct and Indirect Restrictions
Subsection three of Article 13 of the American Convention prohibits
restrictions on freedom of expression that are carried out by indirect means
designed to impede communication." The Ivcher Bronstein case provides an
example of an indirect restriction on freedom of expression. As discussed
above, this important case was initiated based on a decision of the Peruvian
government which deprived the majority shareholder and director of Peruvian
television channel Frecuencia Latina-Canal 2 [Latin Frequency-Channel 2] of
his Peruvian nationality because the channel broadcast various reports of human
rights violations by the Fujimori government.' Pursuant to the legislation,
71. Id.
72. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
73. Jehovah's Witnesses, Case 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1998).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Jehovah's Witnesses, Case 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
79. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(3).
80. See generally ivcher Bronstein Complaint, supra note 68.
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foreigners could not own television or radio stations, and the revocation of
Ivcher Bronstein's Peruvian citizenship resulted in his withdrawal from the
directorship of the channel, the firing of the journalists who had produced
critical programs, and the cessation of the broadcast of negative news about the
Peruvian government.8 1 The Commission decided the case on December 9,
1998, finding that the right to freedom of expression was violated and
recommending that Peru immediately reinstate Ivcher Bronstein's Peruvian
citizenship.82 In the face of the government's refusal to comply, the case was
presented to the Court on March 31, 1999 and, as stated above, the Court
confirmed the Commission's decision that Peru was responsible for violating
Bronstein' s rights. 3
g. Incompatibility of Public and Private Monopolies in Information Media
with Freedom of Expression
The existence of public and private monopolies impedes the dissemination
of individual ideas as well as the reception of the opinions of others. As a
result, the existence of monopolies in the communications industry is
inconsistent with freedom of expression. Both the Court and the Commission
have affirmed this. In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court stated the
following:
If freedom of expression requires, in principle, that the
communication media are potentially open to all without
discrimination or, more precisely, that there be no individuals or
groups that are excluded from access to such media, it must be
recognized also that such media should, in practice, be true
instruments of that freedom and not vehicles for its restriction. It is
the mass media that make the exercise of freedom of expression a
reality. This means that the conditions of its use must conform to the
requirements of this freedom, with the result that there must be, inter
alia, a plurality of means of communication, the barring of all
monopolies thereof, in whatever form, and guarantees for the
protection of the freedom and independence of journalists.8'
In Ivcher Bronstein the Commission affirmed that the free circulation of
ideas is only conceivable where there are multiple sources of information as
well as respect for the communications media.85 It explained it is not enough
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See generally Ivcher Bronstein Sentence, supra note 53.
84. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 35, at para. 34 (emphasis omitted).
85. lvcher Bronstein Complaint, supra note 68, at 28.
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to guarantee the right to found or direct organs dedicated to public opinion; it
is also necessary that journalists and all those professionals working in the
communications media be able to do so with the protections that the free and
independent exercise of this work requires. 6
2. Prohibition of Prior Censorship
One of the principal characteristics of the protection of freedom of
expression in the Inter-American System is that it does not allow prior
censorship. Subsection two of Article 13 of the American Convention provides
that freedom of expression cannot be restricted a priori by any means or under
any excuse without being subject to the subsequent imposition of liability.87
This prohibition on prior censorship implies an acknowledgment that there
is a danger in creating "filters" to decide what individuals can hear, see, or read.
Such a danger does not simply disappear when specific rules that permit prior
censorship in certain cases are adopted, and justifications like "national
security," "morality," or "good habits" are easily used as pretexts to eliminate
or seriously limit the free expression of ideas.
Certainly, this danger is even greater when the domestic agencies are in
charge of prior censorship. In an attempt to limit this danger, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention") was adopted in 1953 shortly after the end of World
War II. The European Convention allowed prior censorship but established an
organ charged with supervising the validity of freedom of expression and the
application of prior censorship in certain enumerated situations.8 In practice,
European organizations have been reluctant to apply prior censorship norms,
86. Id.
87. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(2).
88. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European
Convention]. Article 10 states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. at art. 10.
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signaling a broad interpretation of freedom of expression which minimizes the
censorship option.s9
In the Western Hemisphere, both the Court and the Commission have had
the opportunity to interpret matters involving the prohibition on prior
censorship, from which the following characteristics are evident.
a. Defense of Honor is Excluded as a Basis for Prior Censorship
In Martorell, the Commission affirmed that subsequent imposition of
liability was the only restriction authorized by the American Convention to
protect society from offensive opinions, as well as limiting the abusive exercise
of this right."° The Commission reiterated its interpretation of Article 13 in the
Olmedo case, also brought against Chile. The case involves prior censorship of
the movie The Last Temptation of Christ, and a decision in the case is pending.9
Also awaiting judgment before the Commission is a third Chilean case in which
the book The Black Book of Chilean Justice by Alejandra Matus was
confiscated and its distribution banned.'
According to the Special Rapporteur's 1998 report:
When legislating the protection of honor and dignity referred to in
Article 11 of the American Convention - and when applying the
relevant provisions of domestic law on this subject - States Parties
have an obligation to respect the right of freedom of expression. Prior
censorship, regardless of its form, is contrary to the system that
Article 13 of the Convention guarantees. 3
In Martorell, the Commission also expressed its opinion on the duty to
protect the right to honor and dignity and its possible conflict with the right to
freedom of expression. The government of Chile and the Chilean judiciary
maintained that in the event of a conflict between Articles 11 and 13 of the
American Convention, the former must prevail.9 The Commission rejected this
theory, and advanced its interpretation that the rights included in those two
articles of the American Convention do not present a conflict of different
89. See, e.g., 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. II, sec. B(3) (citing Sunday
Times Case, Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) (1979) and discussing how, in interpreting Article 10 of the European
Convention, the European Court for Human Rights "concluded that 'necessary,' while not synonymous with
'indispensable,' implied 'the existence of a 'pressing social need' and that for a restriction to be 'necessary'
it is not enough to show that it is 'useful,' 'reasonable'or 'desireable"').
90. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para 55.
91. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. lU, sec. C.
92. Id. at ch. III.
93. Id. at ch. U, sec. B(5).
94. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at paras. 60-75.
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principles between which one would have to choose.95 Accordingly, the
Commission quoted the European Court which, in a similar case, considered "it
was faced not with a choice between conflicting principles, one of which is
freedom of expression, but with a principle of freedom of expression that is
subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted."'
b. Authorized Exceptions
Without prejudicing its overall prohibition on prior censorship, the
American Convention permits the following exceptions: 1) censorship of
public entertainment for the exclusive purpose of regulating access to such
events to protect the morals of children and adolescents; 97 and 2) prohibition of
propaganda promoting war or advocating racial, moral, or religious hatred
which incites violence toward individuals or groups. 98 These exceptions,
however, are only permitted within the framework of the Inter-American
System if they conform to the requirements of legality, necessity, reality or
imminence, or valid purpose.
In order to conform to the legality requirement, the exception must be
authorized by law, in the event that decrees or other administrative measures
prove insufficient. The requirement of necessity implies an evaluation of the
pertinence of the measure on a case-by-case basis in order to exclude
improperly motivated prohibitions. If a State can give the required protection
through the police force or if there is no imminent danger, the restriction on
freedom of expression will not satisfy the requirement of necessity. The reality
or imminence requirement refers to measures that are adopted in light of
actually existing conditions or conditions that are certain to occur, not mere
hypothetical situations which might affect the morals of children or adolescents
(in public entertainments) or which incite violence in terms of Article 13. The
valid purpose exception corresponds to cases involving children where
protection of morals is at issue, while in the case of advocacy of war or racial
or religious hatred the protection at issue is that of individuals or groups at
whom the violence is directed.
95. Id.
96. id. at para. 71, n.5 (quoting Sunday Times Case, Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) (1979)).
97. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(4) (providing that "[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole
purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence").
98. Id. at art. 13(5) (providing that "(any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial,
or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any
person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin
shall be considered as offenses punishable by law").
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3. The Impact of Situations of Emergency on Freedom of Expression
The scope of regulations concerning emergency situations is of great
importance to the protection of rights in general, and to the protection of
freedom of expression in particular. Emergency situations - where it is argued
that a threat exists against the life of the nation itself - permit certain restrictions
on rights, including the right of freedom of expression.
In the Western Hemisphere - for many reasons, among them political
instability - emergency situations have been abused. As a result, the American
Convention has regulated the exception extensively. Article 27 of this
Convention establishes the conditions that must exist in order for an emergency
to be declared, the rights that can never be suspended in such a situation, and the
requirements that must be met to suspend other rights. 9 The enumerated
conditions under which such an emergency can be declared are strict.
Specifically, the declaration must be preceded by an event of exceptional
seriousness that affects in a real or imminent way the continued existence of the
State as a whole.1to
Article 27 also specifies that certain rights cannot be temporarily removed
in any event, and others that can only be limited as authorized by the American
Convention, provided that certain conditions listed in the treaty are met.'1 The
99. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 27. Article 27 provides as follows:
i. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under
the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles:
Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to
Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex
Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17
(Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child),
Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government),
or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.
3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately inform
the other States Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organization of American
States, of the provisions the application of which it has suspended, the reasons that
gave rise to the suspension, and the date set for the termination of such suspension.
Id.
100. Id.; see also Claudio Grossman, Situaciones de Ernergencia en el Hemisferio Occidental.
Propuestas Para Fortalecer la Proteccion de Derechos Humanos, in DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL
COMPARADO MEXIcO-ESTADOS UNIDOS 175 (James Frank Smith ed., 1990).
101. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 27; see also Claudio Grossman, El Regimen
Hemisferico Sobre Situaciones de Emergencia, 1993 SERVIClO EDITORIAL DEL INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO
DE DERECHOS HuMANos 155.
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requirements prescribed by the American Convention for the temporary
suspension of rights - including freedom of expression - are: 1) necessity (there
must absolutely not exist any other possible alternatives in the case at hand); 2)
temporarity (in the event temporary suspensions of rights are valid strictly for
the amount of time limited); 3) proportionality (in virtue of the requirement the
measures cannot constitute an excessive reaction on the part of the authorities
in light of the existing emergency); 4) compatibility (with other duties imposed
by international law); 5) non-discrimination; and 6) submission to law by
authorities (since the temporary suspension of rights supposes actions by
authorities consistent with law declared for reasons of general interest and for
the purpose for which they have been established).' In this setting, the
invocation of an emergency to limit freedom of expression requires a case-by-
case analysis to ensure compliance with the legal requirements which authorize
the limitation.
4. Subsequent Liability
The Inter-American System's prohibition on prior censorship does not
exclude the subsequent imposition of liability. But when subsequent liability
is of an exaggerated degree, it effectively "gags" individuals faced with the
threat of danger that is inherent in freedom of expression. Consequently, the
American Convention establishes specific requirements tied to the validity of
subsequent liability. These requirements are: 1) legality; 2) democratic
legitimacy; 3) necessity; 4) proportionality; 5) subjective content; 6)
differentiation between opinions based on facts and value judgments; 7)
preclusion of liability for reproduction of information; and 8) incompatibility
with contempt laws.
a. Legality
Article 13 of the American Convention provides that the subsequent
imposition of liability should be "expressly established by law."' 03 This is
confirmed in Article 30 which provides the restrictions that "may be placed on
the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized [in the American
Convention] may not be applied except in accordance with the purpose for
which such restrictions have been established.""' In its Advisory Opinion OC-
6/86, "The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human
102. Id.
103. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
104. Id. at art. 30; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, May 9, 1986, Series A. No. 6 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-06/86],
available at http:lwww.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/ SERIESA/A_ 6JNG.htm.
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Rights," the Court held that the criteria of Article 30 are applicable in all cases
in which the word "law" or a similar phrase is used by the American
Convention for the purpose of the restrictions which the Court itself authorizes
with respect to each one of the protected rights. 5
Different consequences arise from this concept of legality. First, the norm
that prohibits a given action cannot have a hierarchy inferior to that of the norm
that recognizes the right, for example, a decree or an ordinance. Second, there
is a prohibition on retroactive application, based on the notion that no one can
be responsible for conduct that when undertaken did not involve liability.
b. Democratic Legitimacy
Article 13 requires that in order for the imposition of subsequent liability
to be valid under the Convention, the ends sought to be achieved must be
legitimate."° In Advisory Opinion-05/85, the Court affirmed that this principle
should be understood as one requiring public authorities to conduct themselves
in strict conformity with general juridical norms created by the constitutional
procedures and organs established by each State party. 07 Moreover, the
principle of legality is inseparably linked to that of legitimacy in democratic
societies, by virtue of the international system on which the American
Convention is based. Thus, the effective exercise of representative democracy,
translates, inter alia, into respect for minority participation and the public
good.1°8
c. Necessity
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms uses the expression "necessary in a democratic society,"
while Article 13 of the American Convention omits those specific terms.'" In
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court sustained that this difference in
terminology is not relevant since the European Convention does not contain any
provision comparable with Article 29 of the American Convention."0 As a
105. Advisory Opinion OC-06/86, supra note 104, at para. 17.
106. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
107. Advisory Opinion OC-06186, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Id. at para. 45.
110. Id. at para. 44. Article 29, clauses c) and d) of the American Convention provide as follows:
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or
derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or
d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.
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consequence, the "necessity" of subsequent liability will depend upon whether
it is oriented towards satisfying a compelling public interest within the
framework of representative democracy. Among the options that may be used
to meet this objective, the most closely tailored one should be chosen."'
Finally, whether "public order," "public morals," "national security," "public
health," or some other concept is invoked to establish subsequent liability, such
expressions should be subject to an interpretation strictly tied to the "just
demands" of "a democratic society," that of course includes freedom of
expression.
d. Proportionality
Subsequent liability should be in proportion to the end sought, whether the
end is to assure respect for individual rights or the reputation of third parties,
protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. This
requirement has great importance, since excessive fines, detention, and
imprisonment can have the same chilling effect as prior censorship. What can
be gathered from this is that respect for freedom of expression is not only
assured by prohibitions on prior censorship and the adoption of subsequent
liability, but also that the imposition of these sanctions must be coherent and
proportional to the punished conduct.
e. Subjective Content
The subsequent imposition of liability requires the existence of "actual
malice," which implies acting with intent (positive intention to violate the facts)
or with serious negligence (having been able to foresee the falsity of the
facts)." 2 In its report on contempt, the Commission indirectly established the
requirement for the existence of "actual malice" when it noted the exception that
truth (exceptio veritatis) may be used as a defense is insufficient to protect
freedom of expression." 3 In fact, the exception requires the journalist involved
to prove the defense, thus effectively placing the burden of proof on the
defendant." 4 In the opinion of the Commission, the burden of proof should be
placed on the plaintiff, not on the defendant.' '
Id. at art. 29(c), (d).
111. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 46.
112. 1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 4, at ch. 11, sec. B(1)(a).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Id.
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f Differentiation Between Opinions of Fact and Value Judgments
If there were liability for expressing value judgments, freedom of
expression would be seriously curtailed. In effect, value judgments imply that
each individual has a right to express opinions and interpretations that he or she
believes are adequate. This type of expression is protected in broad terms by
Article 13, which asserts that freedom of expression involves "the freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.""' 6
Value judgments, since they are subjective, do not create liability because
they do not assert facts. They are simply subjective opinions which individuals
can freely determine to be valid or invalid. In the system created by the
American Convention, there is an explicit right not only to "receive"
information but also to "disseminate" opinions." 7 If subsequent imposition of
liability were permitted in the case of the dissemination of value judgments, it
would not only inhibit the person who expresses the opinion, but also inhibit
debate that allows different opinions to be expressed, a form of expression that
enhances society.
g. Exclusion of Liability for Reproduction of Information
The need to exclude liability for the reproduction of the opinions of third
parties is undeniable. To hold those who reproduce the opinions of third parties
liable would seriously limit freedom of expression, given that it would force
those who reproduce the opinions of others to set up verification systems to
assure the veracity of each opinion. These verification systems would prove to
be notoriously onerous for a complex and diverse society where a vast influx of
information proceeds from divergent sources. It should be noted, however, that
within the framework of the American Convention, the exclusion of liability for
reproducing the opinions of third parties does not, of course, imply curtailing
the liability of the individual who made such statements in the first place.
h. Incompatibility of Contempt Laws with the American Convention
Seventeen OAS member states still have contempt laws that provide
punishment for offensive expressions directed at public officials in the
fulfillment of their duties." 8 The Commission has emphatically decreed that
such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression, both through its case
system as well as in its Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato " [Contempt]
116. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
117. Id. atart 13(1),(2).
118. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. A (noting that the countries
that have contempt laws are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic,. Uruguay, and Venezuela).
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Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights ("Report on Contempt
Laws").'' 9
In the Verbitsky case, an Argentine journalist was sentenced to one month
in prison after being found guilty of contempt when he published an article in
the newspaper Pdgina 12 [Page 12] in which he referred to an Argentine
Supreme Court justice as "disgusting."'' " Subsequent to the rejection of his
appeal, Verbitsky brought a complaint before the Commission.' After several
meetings, the parties arrived at a common proposal for friendly settlement,
which was successfully fulfilled when the sentence against Verbitsky was
revoked and all its effects were annulled, and when the contempt statute was
abolished. 2  The Commission accepted this amicable resolution due to its
compatibility with the requirement that friendly settlements would adequately
protect the human rights in conformity with the American Convention."
In its Report on Contempt Laws, the Commission stated that contempt laws
contradict the principle that a properly functioning democracy is the best
guarantee of social harmony and the rule of law, and contempt laws, when
applied, directly affect the type of open debate guaranteed by Article 13 that is
essential to the existence of a democratic society."' Moreover, invoking the
concept of social harmony to justify contempt laws goes directly against the
logic that sustains freedom of expression and thought."z The Commission
emphasized that critical expressions not related to an official's position may be
subject to civil liability for slander and defamation, just as is the case with other
citizens. '
For his part, the Special Rapporteur stated in his 1998 report that "[tihe
contempt laws seek to avoid debate as well as the scrutiny or criticism of state
officials," and that "contempt laws, instead of protecting freedom of expression
or [sic] civil servants limit freedom of expression and weaken the democratic
system.'
'127
119. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1994, at ch. V [hereinafter Report on Contempt Laws],
available at http://www.cidh.oas.organnualep/94eng/94ench5.htm.
120. Case 11.012, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 1. The English version of the case points out that the
Spanish word used in Verbitsky's article was "asqueroso" and explains that the term can mean either
disgusting or disgusted. Id.
121. Id. at para. 3.
122. Id. atparas. 18-20.
123. Id. at para. 20.
124. Report on Contempt Laws, supra note 119, at sec. 4(B).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. A. In a press release, the
Special Rapporteur stated his opposition to a court decision in Argentina that sentenced the journalist Eduardo
Kimmel to one year in jail and a fine. Office of the Special Reporter for Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Press Release, PREN/8/99, available at www.cidh.oas.org/Relatoria/Spanish/ComPrensa8.htn. He
Grossman
5. The Right to Access Information
The right to access information is fundamental to the ongoing development
of democracy. This right is found in subsection one of Article 13 of the
American Convention, which provides that the right to freedom of expression
includes the freedom to seek out and receive information of all kinds.12
With respect to this issue, the Court has noted that "a society that is not
well informed is not a society that is truly free.' ' 129 Restrictions on access to
information in the hands of public or private institutions (e.g., credit
institutions) must be "judged by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic
societies and institutions. ' '""° This implies that the existence of an absolute
prohibition on access to information is incompatible with the American
Convention. Although limited restrictions are possible (e.g., national security),
as with other exceptions, they should be narrowly constructed and subject to
judicial review in all cases.
To guarantee the right of access to information, the Special Rapporteur has
proposed as a remedy the writ of habeas data.'3' Although neither the
Commission nor the Court has yet interpreted what form the proposed remedy
will take, this fact does not in any way prevent the actual exercise of the right
to access information in the hands of government or private entities.
6. Right of Correction and Reply
Having established freedom of expression and thought in Article 13, the
American Convention provides for a right of correction and reply in Article
14.132 In Advisory Opinion OC-07/86 the Court asserted:
reminded that the Court has stated that in a democratic society, political and public figures should be more
open to public scrutiny and criticism, and that open debate, which is crucial to a democratic society, must
necessarily include those persons who participate in the creation or the application of public policy. Id. Since
these individuals are at the center of public debate and are knowingly exposed to public scrutiny, they must
display greater tolerance toward criticism. id.
The United Nations Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression for the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and the OAS Special Rapporteur stated in a joint resolution that laws exist in many
countries, such as contempt laws, that unduly limit the right to freedom of expression, and they prevailed upon
the States to amend those laws in order to bring them in line with their international obligations. 1999 Report
of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 4, at Annex 2.
128. American Convention, supra note 12, art. 13(1).
129. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 70.
130. Id. at para. 42.
131. 1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 4, at ch. 11, sec. B(3).
132. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 14.
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The inescapable relationship between these articles can be deduced
from the nature of the rights recognized therein since, in regulating
the application of the right of reply or correction, the States Parties
must respect the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article
13. They may not, however, interpret the right of freedom of
expression so broadly as to negate the right of reply proclaimed by
Article 14(1).11
The Court added that the right to reply guarantees respect for freedom of
expression in both its individual and shared dimensions:
In the individual dimension, the right of reply or correction
guarantees that a party injured by inaccurate or offensive statements
has the opportunity to express his views and thoughts about the
injurious statements. In the social dimension, the right of reply or
correction gives every person in the community the benefit of new
information that contradicts or disagrees with the previous inaccurate
or offensive statements. In this manner, the right of reply or
correction permits the re-establishment of a balance of information,
an element which is necessary to the formation of a true and correct
public opinion. The formation of public opinion based on true
information is indispensable to the existence of a vital democratic
society.1
34
While the Court has not had the opportunity to apply the law of correction
to a contentious case, its Advisory Opinion OC-07/86 fixes certain elements that
establish the existence of this right. It is important to reiterate that the right of
correction cannot legitimately include value judgments. It should also be noted
that there are many ways of expressing opinions, so assuring correction by the
same means (e.g., location, size, format) inadequately protects freedom of
expression.
7. The Link Between Freedom of Expression and Democracy
Both the Court and the Commission have established that there is an
inherent link between freedom of expression and democracy.' In Advisory
Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed:
133. Advisory Opinion OC-07186, supra note 36, at para. 25.
134. Id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Hector Gros Espiell, at para. 5.
135. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1999, OEA/ser.LJVJII.106 Doc. 6 rev. at Vol. M, Annex 5
(1999) [hereinafter IACHR 1999 Annual Report], available athttp://www.cidh.oas.org/ annualrep/99eng.htn.
The Declaration of Chapultepec, drafted by the Inter-American Press Society and adhered to by several
member countries, affirms that the battle for freedom of expression and of the press, by whatever means, is
an essential cause of democracy and of civilization in the hemisphere. Id.
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Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence
of a democratic society rests. It is indispensable for the formation of
public opinion. It is also a conditio sine qua non for the development
of political parties, trade unions, scientific and cultural societies and,
in general, those who wish to influence the public. It represents, in
short, the means that enable the community, when exercising its
options, to be sufficiently informed. Consequently, it can be said that
a society that is not well informed is not a society that is truly free.'36
In his 1998 Annual Report, the Special Rapporteur stated:
Freedom of expression certainly holds a prominent position among
the different requirements for a participatory and stable democracy.
If it does not exist, it becomes impossible to develop the other
elements needed to deepen democracy. Thus, freedom of expression
has often been said to be the fundamental freedom underlying the
very existence of democratic society.'37
In concluding the report, the Special Rapporteur asserted, "[c]onsolidation of
democracy in the hemisphere is closely related to freedom of expression. When
freedom of expression is limited, the development of democracy is interrupted,
since the free debate of ideas and opinion among citizens is impeded."'3
The link between freedom of expression and democracy has been part of
a development process, within the context of the OAS, that membership is only
open to democratic states. An important milestone in this process was reached
when OAS Resolution 1080 was adopted in Santiago, Chile in 1991.139 The
resolution allows a series of measures to be adopted in cases where the
constitutional process of a country breaks down."4
I. CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the American Convention by both the Court and the
Commission confirms the existence of a legal framework in the Inter-American
System designed to protect freedom of expression. The application of this
framework to specific cases is a fundamental requirement and cornerstone of
democracy, illustrating the scope of this important freedom. Achieving
136. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at par. 70.
137. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at Introduction.
138. Id. at ch. V.
139. O.A.S. Res. 1080 (XXI-O/91), Adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session, June 5, 1991, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm.
140. Id.
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complete freedom of expression in the Western Hemisphere requires that States
fully comply with existing regional norms and that they integrate them into
domestic law. Such compliance and integration constitutes adherence to the
obligations that member States freely contracted to meet through ratification of
the American Convention. To fully meet their obligations, States should
implement the following policies.
First, slander, libel, and defamation should be decriminalized. Within the
framework of a participatory society, the interchange of ideas in political debate
is a fundamental mechanism by which full exercise of freedom of expression
can be attained. Slander, libel, and defamation laws have been used to chill this
mechanism, and the criticism that it can engender, based on the justification that
the offended parties exercise a public function. This stance is contrary to the
principles established in Article 13 of the American Convention. Moreover,
civil actions are an alternative that provides sufficient protection to those who
are subjected to intentional attacks on their honor or reputation.
Second, States should avoid allowing subsequent liability to have a chilling
effect on freedom of expression. Article 13 of the American Convention
establishes that prior censorship is incompatible with full freedom of expression,
and strictly enumerates the circumstances in which it can be applied. Strict
compliance with permissible exceptions is fundamental to prevent the
conversion of the exception into the general rule, taking into account that the
exceptions exist only for use in specific cases, since the general principle is full
freedom of expression.
Third, public and private monopolies in information media should not be
permitted. As this article illustrates, the existence of public and private
monopolies works against the creation of an atmosphere that allows for the
interchange of diverse opinions. To achieve this objective, anti-monopolistic
laws should be developed and strictly enforced.
Fourth, access to information should be guaranteed. The creation of
domestic laws that guarantee free access to information in the hands of
government and private organizations is fundamental to achieving full
protection of freedom of expression. Since it has moved beyond the initial
phase of creating rules and establishing their normative context, the challenge
that now faces the Inter-American System for the protection of human rights is
the full application of those rules and norms. In this new phase of international
supervision, the system requires a combination of measures that will assure the
effectiveness of the Special Rapporteur, provide training to civil servants,
judges, and journalists, provide for the adoption of urgent measures (in cases of
possible irreparable harm), strengthen the case system, and provide for
increased action by political organs.
There are a number of ways these objectives can be achieved. One way is
by allowing the Special Rapporteur to visit countries where freedom of
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expression is seriously threatened without the need to seek prior permission or
receive an invitation from the State. Another is to finance the office of the
Special Rapporteur to guarantee that it has sufficient resources to function
properly. In addition, lawyers and judges should be trained to invoke and apply
international norms in domestic law. This training in both thejurisprudence and
procedure of the Inter-American System can play a preventative role by
fostering internal resolution of problems without the need to involve
international organs.
The Commission should also promulgate preventative measures in the case
of threats against journalists. If the measures are not applied, the cases should
be submitted immediately to the Court in order to raise international awareness
of this type of threat. All cases involving freedom of expression should be
taken to the Court if the State involved does not accept the opinions and
recommendations of the Commission. This will open more possibilities for
enforcing compliance with international norms. Finally, the OAS political
organs should adopt measures directed at States that do not comply with
decisions of the Commission and the Court on freedom of expression issues.
The political organs, at a minimum, should place these issues on the agenda and
discuss them, and also adopt measures of a political nature to promote this
freedom, for example, international sanctions.
There is an ongoing debate about which rights are the most important.
Regardless of whether non-derogable rights or economic, social, cultural, civil,
or political rights take precedence, the discussion itself is only possible if the
right to freedom of expression exists. That is why the right is so crucial, and
why there is a need to ensure full respect for it in the Western Hemisphere.
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